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Developing Infrastructure Projects 
Using Alliances 
 
Dr. Anthony Mills, Dr. Derek Walker 
and Dr. Beverly Lloyd-Walker 
 
ABSTRACT—This research provides a deeper insight into the performance of alliances for the 
construction of road, rail and water projects. The principle objective of alliances is to align team 
member expectations so that they work together for the benefit of the project. To date, this has 
been a challenge, and as such this makes alliances an innovative approach to procurement of 
infrastructure. The paper reports on a survey of 18 public infrastructure projects across Australia 
that used the alliance form of procurement. The results were based on alliance team interviews, 
which addressed the most critical management issues impacting on the performance of process. 
The research identified a sample of stakeholders form alliance leadership teams (ALT) and the 
alliance management teams (AMT) that had recently completed a major infrastructure projects. 
Results revealed that communication and trust between the ALT and AMT teams was a major issue 
that impacted on the effectiveness of the alliance. Furthermore, the research identifies several key 
factors that were necessary preconditions for successful alliances. 
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Introduction 
Strategic alliances in construction have gained a great deal of attention in Australia in particular. D. 
Walker and K. Hampson provide a useful history of alliancing from initial oil and gas examples from 
the literature in the late 1990s to the case study of the National Museum of Australia that they 
undertook and reported upon in their book [1]. Other doctoral studies on project alliancing in 
Australia have added to our knowledge of alliances, their strengths and weaknesses, at a deep level 
[2,3,4] . A recent study on project alliancing was recently published that provides a rich seam of 
knowledge about the ambience of a project alliance as was well as the mind-set of those involved 
[5].  This research investigated the performance of 18 alliances in order to critically examine, the 
effectiveness of the procurement method to deliver successful project outcomes. The result 
indicated that communication and trust between the ALT and AMT teams was a major issue that 
impacted on the effectiveness of the alliance. Furthermore, the research identifies several key 
factors that were necessary preconditions for successful alliances. 
 
The Issues in Project Alliancing 
The selection process for alliances is quite different to other forms of project procurement. The 
partner organization advertises for expressions of interest from a consortium of parties that will 
form an alliance, usually with the partner organisation. The concept is that the consortium parties 
first agree to a commercial arrangement of resources commitment and they agree to a pain-
sharing and gain-sharing arrangement. They also agree to a relationship agreement to work 
together in the prescribed alliance format of collegiality in decision-making and undertaking the 
work and transparency and accountability. Finally, they agree to a no litigation clause for any 
reason other than malicious behavior.  
 
Each alliance consortium puts forward named individuals that they commit to the project for the 
project duration and the quality of the bid is judged on the quality of the team put forward. They 
either allow the probity consultants to determine the ‘reasonable fee’ structure or they set that 
structure and allow the probity auditors to check their financial records to validate that the fee is 
not excessive when compared to average profit levels over past years.  
 
This reduces the selection criteria from haggling over the contract price but determining a 
reasonable return for the input of the expertise of the team to form the leadership and 
management teams. All other costs, including the project site staffing and ancillary costs plus 
materials, sub-contracts etc are treated in a similar way to the cost reimbursable arrangements 
discussed earlier in this chapter. The tender process is rigorous and involves extensive interviews of 
proponent consortia.  
 
A more detailed account of the selection process can be found in Walker and Hampson and a 
model for demonstrating value for money has recently been developed from a number of sources 
including government guides and can be found in the thesis written by C.C. MacDonald [1, 4, 6, 7]   
 
A defining set of attributes emerges from this literature that shows an extension to the partnering 
concept that appears to get over some of the weaknesses inherent in that approach. These 
attributes include: 
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• A contractually structured way to at best overcome or at least minimise potential 
exploitation of one or more alliance participants by others through a ‘all sink or swim 
together’ mind-set. 
• Closer integration of alliances between the partner organisation and non-owner 
participants (NOPs) through an alliance organizational structure with a high level 
alliance leadership team (ALT) comprising the project sponsor/partner organisation and 
senior champions often board-level individuals from NOP organisations plus an alliance 
management team (AMT) that has representatives from each NOP. Decision-making is 
contractually obliged to be by consensus and so while this can be time consuming and 
energy sapping at times, it results in no party being able to finger point at others for 
decision failures by the AMT and ALT. This results in a no-blame culture that facilitates 
the ‘all sink or swim together’ mind-set because failure cannot be laid on any single 
party. 
• A selection process that is predicated upon all participants accepting the alliance 
principles and charter that is established for each project with contractual force. 
• An agreed pain-sharing and gain-sharing commercial agreement that all sign up to. The 
target out-turn cost (TOC) is agreed by all parties and is referenced to an independently 
estimated benchmark cost and then developed to factor in innovation. The TOC 
becomes the baseline that further innovation and efficiencies reduce to release 
potential gain-sharing. The static nature of the TOC acts as an incentive to ensure that 
costs do not exceed this value because pain-sharing arrangements on all participants 
mean that all parties hurt if there is pain. This contractual arrangement strengthens the 
motivation for collegiality and cooperation. 
• The nature of the project alliance agreement reduces power distance so that all parties 
in the AMT and ALT have an equal voice and their expertise is respected. 
• The alliance values are explicit and more specific than a partnering charter. 
 
It is also worth remembering that the alliancing selection processes demands transparency and 
accountability. alliance NOPs agree to and expect to be audited and subject to probity checks.  
 
The advantage of the alliance approach is that it structures in collaboration, better facilitates 
innovation and demands transparency and accountability. The collaborative nature of the 
arrangements means that there is far more flexibility and better coping with uncertainty than with 
other procurement forms. This is because the partner organisations being locked into the alliance 
with the NOPs allows priorities to be agreed to be changed, new ideas and innovations to be 
trialled. It reduces, if not illuminates the energy absorbed in participants engaging in a paper-chase 
to cover themselves for risk and potential litigation, this is a positive product of the no-litigation 
agreement which in turn is supported by the consensus agreement of AMT and ALT decisions so 
that grounds for litigation are undermined by this structure. 
 
This procurement approach does require particular and hard to source skills and attributes of 
participants and team members. This means that there is a structural impediment to its widespread 
adoption so even if it became the preferred choice in the near future it would be difficult to roll out 
globally or even extensively in any one country or region.   
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Barriers to Success 
One of the significant issues with alliances is that they rely on effective project teams that have a 
commitment to a best for project (BfP) approach. This is perceived to be one of key characteristics 
of all alliances that drive their success.  M.W. Sakal [8] puts forward that since alliances work on the 
basis of risk and reward, best for project characteristics are a departure from traditional 
contracting methods because it encourages project participants to work as an integrated team by 
tying the commercial objectives (i.e. profit) of all the parties to the actual outcome of the project 
[8].  
 
Sakal builds on this notion by suggesting that alliance decisions should be made on the basis of 
'best for project' rather than 'best for individual' [8]. Thereby, marking a shift from traditional 
adversarial contracting where compensation is tied to the party's performance. 
 
The Department of Treasury and Finance (DTF,2010) of Victoria states that as participants operate 
in a peer relationship as part of a joint management structure each participant has an equal say in 
decisions for the project [6]. DTF defines 'best for project' as a principle that is based on the 
understanding that the participants will direct their decisions toward the collective vision and 
objectives of the alliance, rather than their own self-interests or the commercial interests of their 
employer [6]. 
 
This sentiment is echoed by a number of authors. K. Manley and coauthors built on this by 
describing the notion of pain-share/gain-share [9]. They describe it as equitable sharing (in fixed 
pre-agreed ratios) of the 'pain' or 'gain' depending on how the outcomes compare with pre-agreed 
targets. Further to this they elaborate that the risk/reward arrangements are designed so that 
exceptional performance will deliver excellent outcomes for all parties while poor performance will 
result in poor outcomes for all parties. To which they conclude that the underlying commercial 
alignment of alliancing is consistent with a 'no blame/best-for-project (BfP) alliance philosophy; 
that focuses all parties on achieving common objectives, so as to attain a 'win-win' result. 
 
M. Bresnen and N. Marshall believe that it is important to tailor incentives to whatever the 
project's key performance indicators are, rather than simply to cost [10]. Through their research 
they found that the attitudes towards pain-share /gain-share arrangements were quite positive and 
they were seen as being useful in helping reinforce collaboration by providing the opportunity of 
both clients and contractors to make gains. 
 
Trust is something that does not just happen. S. Rowlinson and Y. Cheung declare that alliance 
projects reinforce the notion of trust by placing a 'no dispute' clause into the alliance agreement 
[11]. This therefore, reinforces the fundamental alliance philosophy that decision-making is focused 
on the project outcome and 'best for project'. Further to which Rowlinson and Cheung argue that 
developing a formal dispute resolution model in the alliance project might put pressure on the 
alliance parties, decreasing the incentive to work toward 'best for project', opposing the philosophy 
of alliancing [11]. Thereby reiterating the fact that alliancing is based on a totally different legal 
platform than that of traditional contracting or business as usual (BAU) approach. This existence of 
BfP is therefore critical in determine the success of the alliance, and can be compared with more 
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traditional business as usual (BAU) approach. The next section discusses the research questions and 
methodology used to analyse the case studies. 
 
Research Methodology 
The major objective of this research is to examine the extent to which the alliance teams work 
collaboratively to drive a positive project outcome. Past research has shown that the capacity of 
the project team to adopt a best-for-project (BfP) approach compared to a business-as-usual (BAU) 
approach is an essential ingredient to successful alliance procurement. 
 
The data collected used structured interviews of 18 alliance projects or cases.  The project used a 
structured telephone survey technique to gather data on each of the cases.  All projects had 
recently been completed in the previous year, and respondents were asked to provide actual data 
from the project, or reflect on their experience. 
 
Participants for the survey were drawn largely from the membership of Alliance Association of 
Australia (AAA) and the chief executive officer of AAA provided introductions to the contacts. An e-
mail was sent to all potential participants, outlining the research approach, and attaching a plain 
language statement (PLS), consent form, and the list of questions.  All participation in the survey 
was voluntary. All responses were confidential to the interviewer, and no participant can be 
identified by his or her response. From a total target pool of 58 projects, responses were received 
from 14 persons representing 18 alliance projects.   
 
Given that each project was unique, the research methodology adopts the comparative case-based 
approach, and as such draws out issues and themes informed by the findings of cases included in 
the study.  The next section presents the results of the 18 cases, including the sentiments 
expressed by each of the respondents on the performance of the alliance projects.  
 
Results  
All projects were large and complex public infrastructure projects, including freeways, water 
treatment plants, major bridge upgrades, and railways. Project values ranged from AU$17 M to 
over AU$600 M (US$1.00 = AUD$0.97 approx). The interview included a series of 25 structured 
questions, which were segmented into two broad areas; alliance delivery performance and 
commitment to best for project. 
 
Alliance Performance  
The first area reviewed the alliance performance and in particular sought to identify the differences 
between planned and actual time and cost overrun. In addition, the respondents were encouraged 
to provide quantitative responses that allowed for contextualising detail where necessary.   
 
Target Outturn Cost (TOC) Performance 
The results show that projects ranged from -11% (i.e., Uunder) the target outturn cost (TOC) to 128 
% above.  The results showed that 10 (of 18) were over budget, but interesting only four exceed 
the TOC by more than 10%( see table 1). The stakeholders from of these projects were probed to 
determine what occurred which may explain the over-expenditure. Table 1 shows that 
unsurprisingly the most popular a response was increases to scope (Scope change +). 
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ID # Project Type Initial 
TOC 
($m) 
TOC % 
Change 
Reasons 
for 
change in 
TOC 
Planned 
duration 
(months)
Actual 
Time % 
Change 
Reasons for 
change in 
duration 
16 Road & 
Bridge 
$96 128% Scope 
change (+)
36 6% Scope 
change (+) 
4 Water 
Treatment 
$63 28.% Scope 
change 
(+) 
22 14% Other 
3 Road & 
Bridge 
$114 15% Scope 
change (+)
30 0% On Time 
17 Road & 
Bridge 
$116 13% Other 36 0% On Time 
 
 
 
Table 1—Initial Target Outturn Cost (TOC) Compared to Final TOC for Projects Over Budget 
 
 
In instances where the final TOC came in under the initial TOC, the primary reason for this was as a 
result of innovation (identified through the construction phase) or as a result of accelerated 
processes.  Other reasons included favourable weather conditions and having good quality 
assurance processes in place. 
 
In those instances where the project came in over the initial TOC, the primary reason cited was as a 
result of (client directed) scope increase.  Respondents noted that results associated with 
comparing initial TOC with final TOC did not necessarily tell the whole picture, and those projects 
with significant TOC overruns, also performed very well against the other performance indicators, 
like occupational health and safety performance. 
 
Time Performance 
The results showed that when all of the 18 projects were considered, the time performance ranged 
from -6% (ahead of time) to 14% (overtime). While, 5 (of 18) were over time (see table 2); only one 
exceeded the planned duration by more than 10%. This data represents the percentage difference 
between the planned project duration and the final duration.  
 
ID # Project Type Initial 
TOC 
($m) 
TOC % 
Change 
Reasons 
for change 
in TOC 
Planned 
Duration 
(months)
Actual 
Time % 
Change 
Reasons for 
change in 
duration 
4 Water 
Treatment 
$63 28.0% Scope 
change 
(+) 
22 14% Other 
10 Road & 
Bridge 
$218 2.0% No 
comment 
 
28 7% Other 
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9 Rail & Bridge $135 -2.00% No 
comment 
 
17 6% Other 
16 Road & 
Bridge 
$96 128.00% Scope 
change (+)
36 6% Scope 
change (+) 
18 Water 
Treatment 
$230 6.90% Scope 
change (+)
34 3% Scope 
change (+) 
 
 
Table 2—Planned Time Duration Compared to Final Time Duration for Projects Overtime  
 
 
The research shows that despite some increase in scope the projects were not excessively 
overtime. Respondents noted that approximately one third of the alliance projects came in under 
time, and one third came in over time (see table 2).  The remaining third were on time.   
 
The project participants were then asked to explain the major reason for the time overrun. In a 
similar way to the cost performance mentioned above, the principal reason for the time overrun 
was positive scope change, in other words, increases to the project scope. It also should be noted 
that in some instances where projects exceeded the estimated duration, this was not necessarily 
considered a failure, but rather a result of scope change that resulted in an improved final product.   
 
In the instances where projects came in under time, innovation (including accelerated processes) 
and methodological change were cited as the contributing factors.  The alliance methodology was 
considered by all respondents to be a process that has sufficient flexibility to address changes in 
scope in a positive manner. Additionally, because of the requirement that major decisions made by 
the ALT and AMT members are unanimous, that leads to project team participants having a no-
blame mind-set, this improves the operational flexibility. The project team has confidence in 
proposing and enacting innovation and to rapidly re-align deliverable priorities when required in 
response to threats or opportunities. Thus, benefits derived from scope changes or deliverable re-
prioritisation can be greater than would occur in more rigid contractual forms of procurement. 
 
Benefit to Client 
This section of the paper looks at critical factors that influence success of alliances, and reports 
how this innovative relational contract seeks to address the inherent problems of traditional 
contracting methods in an industry that is resistant to change. The alliance in this research included 
contractors who would normally be considered as competitors, but have joined together as each 
can supply specialist services for the project. This implies that the project participants collaborate 
and should resist the adoption a business as usual (BAU) approach. 
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Figure 1—Alliance Management Team Exceeded a Business as Usual (BAU) Attitude (Q13)  
 
 
Respondents were asked to gauge the performance of the alliance management team (AMT) 
against several indicators, including business as usual (BAU), and best for project (BfP). The results 
(see figure 1) of the survey showed that 16 (of 18) respondents agreed that project participants 
exceeded the BAU attitude. 
 
 
Figure 2—The Alliance Management Team adopted a Best for Project (BfP) approach (Q14) 
Figure 2 
 
Past research has shown that a critical factor for success in alliances is the ability to collaborate as 
teams, in particular to adopt a best for project (BfP) approach. The second area of this research 
asked respondents to rate the performance of the AMT on a Likert scale from 1 (strongly disagree) 
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to 5 (strongly agree).  Additional contextualizing detail for each question was encouraged, but not 
mandatory. The results (see figure 2) show that the 15 (of 18) participants agreed that project 
management team adopted the BfP attitude.  
 
Past research in the area suggested that alliance decisions should be made on the basis of 'best for 
project' rather than 'best for individual' [8, 12, 13]. This is designed to shift the project team from 
traditional adversarial contracting where compensation is tied to the party's performance to one 
that encourages collaboration and innovation. The results (see figure 2) show that most responded 
agree that team members adopted a BfP approach. 
 
 
Figure 3—Alliance Leadership Team Supports the Role of the Alliance Management Team (Q16) 
 
 
There is a strong sense that the AMT is committed to performing above business as usual (BAU) 
with the majority of respondents rating this statement very high in the scale (Question 13).  
Similarly, respondents also considered that the AMT acted according to best for project (BfP) 
(Question 14).   The final question related to the support that the AMT from the ALT (see figure 3). 
This question (question 16) was a proxy of the trust that existed between the two management 
groups within the alliance. Results indicate a high level of trust, 15 (or 18) projects respondents 
indicating that support was strong. 
 
The next section discusses the more troubled case studies, including the impact of team attitude 
and trust in creating successful alliances. Finally, the paper makes some general remarks about the 
future of alliancing for the delivery of infrastructure projects. 
 
Discussion 
It may also be important to note that all respondents considered that their projects were a success. 
While the authors acknowledge that it may be difficult to be precise about what constitutes good 
or poor performance in construction. It is clear that most of the projects in this research did meet 
their cost and time expectations, and on the limited basis were considered successful. 
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It is very obvious from the data shown above, that only a minority of alliance projects in the survey 
did not meet time and cost expectations. It also seems clear from the survey that participants 
believe that project participants display the necessary trust and “best for project” attitudes that is a 
precondition to successful alliances. This outcome supports other similar research by AAA, which 
showed that all but 5 (of 30) alliance projects surveyed met time and cost targets [14]. 
 
This next section of the paper looks to investigate the most problematic projects in the research 
data, in order to examine how the attitudes and behaviours impacted on the measurable 
outcomes.  
 
If cost performance is considered (see table 1), three of the worst performing projects all had 
increases in scope; which according to the respondents increased the final cost. And when time 
performance is considered (table 2) three (of 5) of the projects overtime had scope increases also. 
 
One of the road and bridge projects (ID #16) had a 128% increase in TOC but was competed in only 
6% over the planned time duration. The respondent for that case reported very strong support for 
a commitment for BfP (see table 3). The project team exceeded a BAU approach, and displayed 
high levels of support for the AMT. The project included the delivery of a bus way, which needed 
high levels of community consultation. The project responded reported that extensive interviewing 
of stakeholder groups was successful in delivering a good support for the infrastructure delivery 
process. 
 
The flexibilty of an alliance allows project participants to change the scope late in the procurement 
process, but it also implies that the team become innovative to achieve the project’s key results.  In 
particular, it relies on the ability of the alliance leadership team (ALT) to work cooperatively with 
the alliance management team (AMT). Research by P. Love, D. Mistry and P. Davis  states  that  the 
development of a leadership enriched culture, "where people view the project as an extension of 
themselves and feel good about what they personally achieve through cooperation" was deemed 
necessary for the successful implementation of a price competitive alliance [15]. One other 
respondent commented: 
 
“The AMT was extremely focussed as a group on the project … and continually challenged each 
other on how to achieve extraordinary outcomes by use of synergy and innovation.” 
 
In contrast, one of the water projects (ID #4) had a 28% increase in TOC and was competed in 14% 
more time than planned, while the project team exceeded a BAU approach, and displayed high 
levels of support for the AMT. The respondent for this case reported little support for a 
commitment for BfP (3 of 5).  
 
A closer examination of this project indicated that the teams did not perform as well as may have 
been expected. The respondent for the ID#4 project stated that; “Because of the competitive 
alliance process, the AMT tended at times to revert to a D&C mentality”. This presumably meant 
that at certain times the team were motivated more by self-interest, than what may have been 
considered ‘best for project.” 
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This case in particular highlights that preconditions necessary for a successful alliance. Project 
alliancing is generally suitable for the delivery of projects with certain characteristics, such as; high-
risk, tight timeframe, complex stakeholder issues and complex external environments [16]. 
Theoretically, alliancing is a promising delivery method in those situations, but there is no 
guarantees that it will lead to optimum outcomes in practice [16]. Instead, J. Ross suggests that 
some alliances are being undertaken by clients, and to lesser extent contractors, without sufficient 
commitment to underlying principles [17]. In some cases, this may result in projects lacking the 
attitudes and leadership skills needed to establish and sustain a high performing alliance. At best 
this may lead to sub-optimal alliances, at worst a breakdown in corporate relationships and serious 
project failures and could damage the plausibility of the alliance model. 
 
Conclusion 
To summarize the underpinning theory and literature that has informed this research, argues that 
Alliancing represent a heightened level of project management where the project partners engages 
fully as a project leadership team and management in order to take on more demanding projects.  
 
Relationship-based procurement, and alliances in particular, is based on: collaboration through 
joint problem framing and solving; a model of success is wider than time/cost/fitness for purpose; 
and the driver for alliances being based on best-for-project needs and means. The tangible 
outcome of the project is the delivery of the expected benefit, a functioning hospital, 
transportation infrastructure, water supply, or sewerage system. The intangible behavioral 
outcome of the alliance is demonstrated mutual respect, collaborative process and action and trust 
and commitment. The implications of this are that: 
 
• If collaboration is the first order determinant of value then trust, commitment, 
authentic ethical behaviour and ability to achieve complementarities must be valued, 
appreciated and nurtured. 
• This requires authentic leadership behaviours that conform to cultural norms of what all 
parties perceive to be ethical from their perspective. 
• This requires energy being transferred to governance based solely on the ‘iron triangle’ 
(time, cost, fit-for purpose) to a governance framework that is based upon cultural-
behavioural alignment of shared norms. This means that those leading alliances must 
possess a different mix of a leadership skill set than those engaged in BAU projects. And,  
• Organizations need to consider the strategic impact upon their organisations from their 
key staff being engaged in alliances in terms of strategy re-alignment as well as 
opportunities and threats that this exposure presents. 
 
Finally, this research has investigated the performance of 18 alliances in order to critically examine, 
the effectiveness of the procurement method to deliver successful project outcomes. The results of 
the cases investigated show that the vast majority performed very well. The alliance teams seemed 
to adopt the required attitudes and behaviors, and also met time and cast targets. Overall, the 
alliance method of procurement seems to have exerted a positive influence on the projects in this 
study.  
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Nevertheless, each of the projects were unique and presented different challenges to the team 
members. When a few of the more troublesome projects were investigated it became clear that 
the team culture was critical to its success. The intangible behavioural outcomes can lead to 
learning about how to work in this way on future projects so that behavioural learning becomes an 
important alliance outcome 
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